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7he recent passage of an equitable distribution statute in North
Carolina marks a profound change in the distribution ofproperty upon
divorce. Through a statutory scheme that classifies theproperty subject
to division as marital or separateproperty and enumerates thefactors to
be consideredfor equitable distribution, the statute seeks to effect the
partnersho concept of marriage. In this article, Professor Sharp re-
views many of the diyfcult interpretive problems raised by the statutory
defnitions of marital and separate property. Using the experience of
other classfication-based states as a reference, Professor Sharp offers
an assessment of the considerations that should beparamount in imple-
menting the often conflicting goals evidenced by the equitable distribu-
tion format.
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 1, 1981, North Carolina became the fortieth common-law
state to adopt a system for equitable distribution of property upon divorce.'
The rapid growth of equitable distribution systems is largely reflective of the
concept of marriage as a partnership, a shared enterprise to which both
spouses make valuable contributions, albeit often in different ways. 2 In partic-
ular, such systems give long overdue recognition to the invaluable role played
by a homemaker spouse. Equitable distribution aims, quite simply, at a fair
distribution of property upon dissolution of marriage: it seeks to effect upon
divorce those sharing principles that motivate most couples during marriage.
3
Because it invests nontitled spouses with rights to property, the new stat-
ute does not merely create new rules for an old game in North Carolina. It
t Associate Professor, University of North Carolina. B.A. 1964, Murray State University;
M.A. 1966, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill); J.D. 1977, Memphis State Law School;
LL.M. 1978, Yale University. This project was supported by a grant from the North Carolina Law
Center.
1. Act of July 3, 1981, ch. 815, 1981 N.C. SEss. LAWS, 1ST SEss. 1184 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). Apparently only Mississippi, Virginia and West Virginia re-
main wedded to the traditional common-law scheme under which title alone controls the disposi-
tion of property upon divorce. See H. FOSTER, NEw YORK EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LAW 613
(1980), Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Ffiy States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L.Q. 229, 250 (1981).
2. See, e.g., Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 229, 320 A.2d 496, 501-02 (1974); Kulzer,
Law and the Housewfe: Propery, Divorce, and Death, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 1, 18-22 (1975).
3. For an excellent discussion on the prevalence of sharing principles during marriage, and
the effect of divorce property laws on those principles, see Prager, Sharing Princiles and the Future
of Marital Property Law, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1978). See also, Comment, WJFat's YoursisMine
and Whatr Mine is Mine: The Classification of the Home Upon Dissolution, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
1365 (1981).
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marks the greatest change in the domestic law of the state since at least the
turn of the century. 4 In general it requires judges to undertake two major
tasks: the determination of what property is subject to division, and the distri-
bution of such property in a manner that is, in accord with a number of statu-
tory factors that must be considered, equitable.5 The first task is no less
critical than the second if the goal of fair distribution is to be achieved.
The North Carolina statute is unusually detailed and complex. It antici-
pates and resolves many issues that have been ihe subject of extensive litiga-
tion in other states, but it leaves many other questions unanswered. A full
discussion of the ramifications and complexities of G.S. 50-20 is beyond the
scope of this article.6 This discussion will, however, draw upon the exper-
iences of other jurisdictions to suggest partial answers to the critical issue of
what property is, or is not, subject to distribution. Defining the parameters of
marital property is not merely the first step in equitable distribution: it is the
most important one as well. Neither the statutory distributional factors nor
judicial wisdom can effectuate a fair division of marital property unless that
property is defined fairly in the first instance.
Here, as elsewhere, determining the boundaries of marital property will
prove to be an extremely troublesome, and often troubling, task. In particular,
the statutory provisions dealing with property acquired before marriage, in-
creases in value of separate property, interspousal gifts, and property ex-
changed for separate property raise many difficult issues. It is hoped that
some of the resolutions to such issues suggested in this article will illustrate the
need to balance the cautious legislative embodiment of the marital partnership




In the majority of common-law equitable distribution states, all property
owned by either or both spouses at the time of divorce may, at least in some
circumstances, be subject to judicially imposed distribution. 7 Thus, the classi-
4. Manqy commentators had mistakenly characterized North Carolina as an equitable distri-
bution state prior to passage of the new Act. See, e.g., H. FOSTER, supra note 1, at 614; Freed &
Foster, supra note 1, at 250; Comment, supra note 3, at 1370 n.27. The source for this misinterpre-
tation was undoubtedly G.S. 50-16.7(a), which provides for payment of alimony "by transfer of
title or possession of personal property or any interest therein, or a security interest in or posses-
sion of real property .. " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.7(a) (1976). Contrary to what has occurred
in some states, however, this alimony provision was emphatically not the vehicle for the introduc-
tion of equitable principles into the domestic law of North Carolina. See, e.g., Leatherman v.
Leatherman, 297 N.C. 618, 256 S.E.2d 793 (1979).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (a),(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981). See also infra note 19 and accompa-
nying text.
6. The procedural issues raised by various sections of the statute are in themselves quite
formidable. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 27. Likewise, the effect of the new statute on
private agreements is a topic whose implications are too vast for inclusion in this article.
7. Comment, supra note 3, at 1370 n.27. See also Note, Property Division and Alimony
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fication of property as "separate" or "marital" does not limit a court's capacity
to distribute property. Such classifications nonetheless do affect the division of
property in a significant manner. Most of these "all property" states require a
court to consider several factors in determining what constitutes a fair or equi-
table distribution, the most common of which is the contribution of each party
to the acquisition of the property.8 The result is that the distribution of "sepa-
rate" property will, in all likelihood, be the same as that which would have
been reached had the property not been subject to distribution at all. In the-
ory, an "all property" state creates a large pool of assets subject to division,
thus allowing the exercise of greater judicial discretion to achieve fairness. 9 In
practice, it appears that property acquired largely through the efforts of one
spouse will be distributed to the other spouse only in very rare
circumstances. '0
Under the North Carolina statute, however, only property determined to
be "marital" within the definition of G.S. 50-20(b)(1) is subject to equitable
distribution. I I The new statute thereby falls into what has aptly been charac-
terized as.a "deferred community property law" system, under which property
classified ks separate is completely immune from distribution.12 As the label
indicates, this system is in many ways more closely related to the community
property system than to the "all property" approach of the majority of equita-
ble distribution states. 13 By definition, classification-based states subject a
smaller pool of assets to distribution, thereby creating greater limits upon judi-
cial discretion than do "all property" states.
Awards: A Survey of Statutory Limitations on Judicial Discretion, 50 FoRDHtAN L. REV. 415, 427
(1981).
8. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11(b) (Burns 1980) (whether property is acquired
prior to marriage or through inheritance or gift is a factor to be considered in distribution); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 1981) (separate property not available for distribution unless a refusal
to divide would be inequitable); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1981) (manner of acquisition
of assets only a factor to be considered in distribution); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981)
(gifts or property exchanged therefor cannot be subject to division unless hardship would other-
wise result); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-114 (1977) (party through whom property was acquired is a distri-
bution factor).
9. Greene, Comparison of the PropertyAspects of the Community Property and Common-Law
Marital Property Systems and Their Relative Compatibility with the Current View of the Marriage
Relationship and the Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 71, 101 (1979).
10. For instance, Wisconsin requires the return of separate property to each spouse "except
upon a finding that refusal to divide such property will create a hardship on the other party or on
the children of the marriage." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981).
11. "Upon application of a party, the court shall determine what is the marital property and
shall provide for an equitable distribution of the marital property between the parties .... " N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-20(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Under subsection (d) of the statute, the parties may
also agree privately, by written agreement, to distribute their property. It should be noted that the
statute says "distribution of the marital property" (emphasis added), but presumably spouses can
divide their separate property as well, under existing law as provided for in G.S. 52-10 and G.S.
52-10.1. In any event, property excluded by a valid separation agreement would constitute an
eighth variety of separate property.
12. Prager, supra note 3, at 3; Comment, The Development of Sharing Principles in Common
Law Marital Property States, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1269, 1282 (1981).
13. Many commentators have noted the degree to which the community and common-law
property systems have begun to converge, particularly within the previ6us two decades. See, e.g.,
Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Criticism
and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 45 (1981); Comment, supra note 12, at 1270.
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In addition to the community property states, there are at least nine other
common-law states that also restrict equitable distribution to marital prop-
erty.14 The experience of these states will therefore provide the most valuable
guidance for interpretation of the marital and separate property provisions of
the North Carolina statute.
B. Marital Property in North Carolina
As in most classification-based states, the definition of marital property in
North Carolina is essentially a negative one: marital property is "all real and
personal property acquired by either spouse during the course of the marriage
and presently owned, except property determined to be separate property."'t5
Such language has been uniformly held to create a presumption that all prop-
erty acquired during a marriage is marital. 16 The presumption is rebuttable
by proof that property was separately acquired.'
7
Unlike most other states, however, North Carolina makes an additional
presumption that marital property should be divided equally, unless "the court
determines that an equal division is not equitable."' 8 In that event, the court
is directed to divide the property "equitably," taking into consideration twelve
elaborately specified factors, including "[a]ny other factor which the court
finds to be just and proper."' 9 It is unclear whether these factors are to be
14. COL. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (1981); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503 (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.190 (Supp. 1980); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722A (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330 (Vernon Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981-82); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(d) (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1981-82). The District of Columbia also has a classification-based system. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
910 (1981). Additionally, several states will invade separate property only in limited circum-
stances. See supra notes 8 & 10 and accompanying text.
These states have essentially adopted Alternative B of § 307 of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act [hereinafter cited as UMDA]. Alternative A draws no distinction between marital
and separate property. Alternative B was included at the insistence of the community property
states. See UMDA § 307, Commissioner's Comment (1973); Rheinstein, Division of MarltalProp-
erty, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 413, 426-30 (1976).
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981). For a discussion of the possible sig-
nificance of the omission of property acquired by "both" spouses see infra notes 28-32 and accom-
panying text.
16. See, e.g., E.C.W. v. M.A.W., 419 A.2d 934 (Del. 1980); Hemily v. Hemily, 403 A.2d 1139
(D.C. 1979); Jaeger v. Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196,
320 A.2d 484 (1974). The statutes of several states also provide that all property acquired during
marriage will be presumed marital. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(b) (Smith-Hurd 1980); KY.
Ray. STAT. § 403.190(3) (Supp. 1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(0 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1981-
82). The original version of § 307 of the UMDA contained the same presumption.
17. In Illinois, for example, the presumption may be rebutted only by "clear, convincing and
unmistakable" evidence to the contrary. In re Marriage of Severns, 93 Ill. App. 3d 122, 125, 416
N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (1981). In Kentucky the presumption can be rebutted only by tracing the
alleged separate property into specific assets. Brunson v. Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Arkansas and Wisconsin also have the
same rebuttable presumption. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(A)(1) (Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.255 (West 1981). Idaho statutory law calls for a substantially equal division unless "compel-
ling reasons" exist to the contrary. IDAHO CODE § 32-712(1)(a) (Supp. 1981). California requires
an equal division of community property. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1981).
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(12) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Factors the court is to consider
under G.S. 50-20(c) include:
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taken into account only in making the initial determination that an equal divi-
sion would be inequitable, or in the determination of what would be equitable,
or, as is more likely, in both instances.20 It is clear, however, that the various
factors are intended as guidelines to aid decision-makers in the determination
of a fair division of property. They should not be allowed to assume the status
of independent principles or rules of law. In any case, given the scope of the
factors to be considered, the presumption of an equal division should not be
difficult to rebut.2 ' At a minimum, this presumption should provide a fifty-
fifty "starting point" for distribution of marital assets.
A major question left unanswered by the North Carolina definition of
marital property is the time at which the marriage ceases to exist for purposes
of accumulation and evaluation of marital property.2 2 Nearly all states have
fixed some event or events, symbolic of the breakdown of the marriage, as the
date after which assets accumulated by either party will no longer be deemed
(1) The income, property, and liabilities of each party at the time the division of prop-
erty is to become effective;
(2) Any obligation for support arising out of a prior marriage;
(3) The duration of the marriage and age and physical and mental health of both
parties;
(4) The need of a parent with custody of a child or children of the marriage to occupy
or own the marital residence and to use or own As household effects;
(5) Vested pension or retirement rights and the expectation of non-vested pension or
retirement rights, which are separate property;
(6) Any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the
acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint
efforts or expenditures and contributions and services, or lack thereof, as a spouse,
parent, wage earner or homemaker;,
(7) Any direct or indirect contribution made by one spouse to help educate or develop
the career potential of the other spouse;
(8) Any direct contribution to an increase in value of separate property which occurs
during the course of the marriage;
(9) The liquid or nonliquid character of all marital property;
(10) The difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business,
corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or
interest intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party;
(11) The tax consequences to each party; and
(12) Any other factor which the court finds to be just and proper.
The "any other factor" language was apparently intended to allow for consideration of fault in
property divisions. Alimony is wholly fault-based in North Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
16.2 (1976). See generally Note, The Discretionary Factor in the Equitable Distribution Act, 60
N.C.L. REv. 1399 (1982). It is also, however, a means by which factors that were excluded from
enumeration may be considered. It is to be hoped that the subsection will be used in positive
ways, as, for instance, to allow for consideration of the future earning capacities of the spouses, a
notable omission from the enumerated factors.
20. In any event, subsection (j) of the statute requires a court to make "written findings of
fact that support the determination that the marital property has been equitably divided." N.C.
GEN. STAT. & 50-20(j) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
21. It has apparently provided little more than this in Arkansas and Wisconsin, supra note
18, where fairly unequal divisions of property have been upheld. See, e.g., Forsgren v. Forsgren,
630 S.W.2d 64 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982); Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 358 (1982);
Jasper v. Jasper, 107 Wis. 2d 59, 318 N.W.2d 792 (1982).
22. Without such a date certain, "[m]eaningful settlement discussions would be virtually im-
possible; trials would be lengthened; fees for experts would skyrocket as they assimilate the neces-
sary data to have an opinion on the fair market value of the numerous items of marital property
on any number of dates . In re Marriage of Taylor, - Ind. App.-, -, 425 N.E.2d 649,
650 (1981).
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to have been "acquired during the marriage. ' 23 This date will normally be
used for evaluation of assets, at least in the absence of some stipulation to a
different date by the parties.24 In no jurisdiction has mere physical separation
of the parties been deemed sufficient for either purpose.25 Common "cut-off"
points include the date of legal separation, filing of an action, time of trial, or
time of divorce.26 Various provisions of the North Carolina statute suggest
that marital property may continue to be acquired in this state until an action
for equitable distribution is filed.
27
Another potential difficulty with North Carolina's definition of marital
property is that subsection (b)(1) omits property acquired by "both" parties.
28
This should not, however, be interpreted as an intention to exclude jointly
held property from equitable division. With one exception, 29 all common-law
states have held that all jointly held property is subject to distribution.30 One
23. See infra note 26. But see Schamber v. Schamber, 41 Mich. App. 589, 200 N.W.2d 454
(1972); Berish v. Berish, 69 Ohio St. 2d 318, 432 N.E.2d 183 (1982) (courts refusing to set any rules
to determine when the marriage ceased, preferring to leave the matter within the discretion of the
trial judge).
24. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Taylor, -Ind App. -, 425 N.E.2d 649 (1981). See also cases
cited infra at note 26.
25. See Bussell v. Bussell, 623 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1981); Stallings v. Stallings, 606 S.W.2d 163
(Ky. 1980); Murano v. Murano, - N.H. -, 442 A.2d 597 (1982).
26. New Jersey case law on this issue is particularly well developed, since its statute does not
specify a date for valuation or cut-off of asset accumulation. The leading case is Brandenburg v.
Brandenburg, 167 N.J. Super. 256, 400 A.2d 823 (App. Div. 1979), reidon other grounds, 83 N.J.
198, 416 A.2d 327 (1980). See also In re Marriage of Moffatt, 279 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa 1979) (time of
trial or divorce); Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d
1218 (Utah 1980) (time of divorce decree); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d 327, 309 N.W.2d
343 (1981); Storm v. Storm, 470 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1970) (time complaint is filed). Colorado, Illinois,
Kentucky, Maine, and Missouri exclude from division any property acquired by a spouse after a
legal separation. COLo. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113(2)(c) (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a)(3)
(Smith-Hurd 1980); Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.190(2)(c) (Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 722A(2)(c) (1981); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330(3) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1981). New York defines
marital property as "all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and
before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action."
N.Y. DOM. REL. L. § 236.1.c (McKinney Supp. 1981-82).
27. G.S. 50-21 states that "[ulpon application ofa party to an action for divorce, an equitable
distribution of property shall follow a decree of absolute divorce." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21
(Cum. Supp. 1981). The section causes obvious confusion. Apparently, a party may only file for
equitable distribution when he or she files for divorce; G.S. 50-20(k) indicates that the rights of the
parties to distribution of marital property vest "at the time of the filing of the divorce action." It is
unclear, however, if one may file for equitable distribution at the time of filing for a divorce from
bed and board (which requires no set separation period) or only at the time of filing for an abso-
lute divorce (which, under G.S. 50-6, the "no-fault" divorce statute, requires one year's waiting
period).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
29. See Warren v. Warren, 273 Ark. 528, 623 S.W.2d 813 (1981) (construing ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1981)). Warren held that the 1979 Arkansas equitable distribution act was
not applicable to property owned as tenants by the entirety. Arkansas, however, has a peculiar
history surrounding entireties property. See Davies v. Johnson, 124 Ark. 390, 187 S.W. 323
(1916).
30. The decision most directly on point is Kobylack v. Kobylack, I10 Misc. 2d 402, 442
N.Y.S.2d 392 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (construing N.Y. DOM. REL. L. § 236, pt. B(5)(d)(6) (McKinney
Supp. 1981)). See also Grant v. Grant, 424 A.2d 139 (Me. 1981) (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit, 19,
§ 722A(3) (1981) (defines marital property as property acquired by "either" spouse, just as does
the North Carolina statute); Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1977) (error not to divide
jointly held property equitably); Sanders v. Sanders, 118 N.J. Super. 327, 287 A.2d 464 (1972)
(construing N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A-34-23 (West Supp. 1981)).
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court that specifically addressed the issue concluded that in "light of the inten-
tion of the legislature in enacting the equitable distribution law, the failure to
expressly include jointly owned realty as an item which may be equitably dis-
tributed must be deemed an oversight. For otherwise the very intention of the
legislature could be subverted." 3' Exempting jointly held property from dis-




The most unique feature of the North Carolina statute is the broad defini-
tion of separate property in subsection (b)(2).33 Seven different types of sepa-
rate property are enumerated: (1) property acquired before marriage,
(2) property acquired by bequest, devise, descent, or gift during the marriage,
except that "property acquired by gift from the other spouse during the course
of the marriage shall be considered separate property only if such an intention
is stated in the conveyance," (3) property acquired in exchange for separate
property, "regardless of whether the title is in the name of the husband or wife
or both," (4) increases in value of separate property, (5) income derived from
separate property, (6) all "professional licenses and business licenses which
would terminate on transfer," and (7) "vested pension or retirement rights and
the expectation of nonvested pension or retirement rights."
'34
This section thus creates, by definition alone, a smaller pool of assets sub-
ject to division than any other state in the union. It is in this light that the
equal presumption could take on somewhat ominous proportions, since an
equal division of a negligible pool of marital assets could be quite inequitable.
The potential for unjust results is at least partially mitigated by subsection (c),
under which four of the types of separate property are listed as "factors" to be
considered in making an equitable distribution.35 These discretionary factors,
however, will be of limited or no utility as a means of effecting truly equitable
divisions of property if the pool of marital assets is, as it is apt to be in North
Carolina, small or nonexistent in the first instance.
3 6
Moreover, even this elaborate definition of separate property does not ad-
31. Kobylack v. Kobylack, 110 Misc. 2d at -, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
32. A fine study recently conducted in California concluded that the typical divorcing couple
had a total net worth ofonly $10,900. Only 12% had assets of$100,000 or more. The family home
was the major community asset for almost half of divorcing couples. Weitzman, The Economics of
Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1181, 1191-94 (1981).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 50-20(c). These assets include pension rights, and contributions to the education of
a spouse, to increases in value of separate property, and to acquisition of certain kinds of property.
36. In 1979 North Carolina ranked 41st nationwide in median family income. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 441 (1981). See also Weitzman,
supra note 32, at 1188.
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dress adequately many of the issues that have been particularly troublesome in
other states and that are likely to cause even greater interpretative difficulties
in North Carolina. The answers that courts ultimately give to some of these
issues could do much to redress the imbalance created by the extraordinarily
narrow definition of marital property. Fortunately, there is sufficient ambigu-
ity in statutory terms such as "acquired during marriage" or "increase in
value" to allow courts the opportunity to mitigate the inequitable results that
are otherwise likely to be created in North Carolina.
B. Property Acquired Before Marriage
All classification-based states, including community property jurisdic-
tions, exclude from marital property any property acquired by a spouse prior
to marriage.37 The apparently straightforward language exempting such prop-
erty is, however, somewhat deceptive. In particular, it does not resolve one of
the most difficult and most frequently encountered problems that arises in a
property division context: when does "acquisition" of property occur? Con-
sider the common situation in which one spouse acquires legal title before
marriage but mortgage payments are made from marital funds throughout a
period of years.38 Is the house to be classified as separate or marital property?
There are basically three options for courts confronted with this all too
frequent situation. The older, and currently less well regarded, approach uses
the "inception of title" theory, under which the status of property as either
marital or separate is permanently fixed at the time title is acquired, regardless
of the subsequent use of marital funds to pay for or improve it.39 This ap-
proach is much more common to community property states,40 although it has
recently been adopted in Missouri, a common-law jurisdiction.4t
37. See supra note 11. These statutory provisions have also been interpreted to exclude prop-
erty acquired before marriage but during the time when parties were living with each other. See,
ag., Grisham v. Grisham, 407 A.2d 9 (Me. 1979), Smith v. Smith, 497 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1973).
38. A similar problem is created when property is bought after marriage but with a down
payment made from separate funds. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1380.
39. Krauskopf, Marital Property at Marriage Dissolution, 43 Mo. L. REV. 157, 180 (1978).
See also W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 130-31 (2d ed.
1971), in which the authors point out that this approach actually creates a presumption, rebuttable
by showing that the asset was intended to be community property once the marriage took place.
40. See, e.g., Kingsbery v. Kingsbery, 93 Ariz. 217, 379 P.2d 893 (1963); Fisher v. Fisher, 86
Idaho 131, 383 P.2d 840 (1963); Michelson v. Michelson, 89 N.M. 282, 551 P.2d 638 (1976); Baker
v. Baker, 80 Wash. 2d 736, 498 P.2d 315 (1972).
41. Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). In Cain, the husband bought farm
property (worth $565,000 at the time of divorce) a few months before marriage for a down pay-
ment of $20,000. Despite the fact that 85% of the total payments for its purchase were derived
from marital funds, the property was held to be the husband's separate property. The Cain court
reasoned that a contrary result would mean that the property had not been "acquired" until it was
paid for. See also Stark v. Stark, 539 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (similar judicial conclusion
reached when a joint mortgage obligation was created after marriage on property husband had
owned prior to the marriage).
It is possible that the inception of title rule has also been adopted in the District of Columbia.
In Brice v. Brice, 411 A.2d 340 (D.C. 1980), the court held that a home bought two months before
marriage remained the separate property of the husband despite the fact that payments for it were
made throughout the ten-year marriage. In Darling v. Darling, 444 A.2d 20 (D.C. 1982), how-
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In a majority of states adopting the inception of title theory, the nonown-
ing spouse is entitled to reimbursement for the community funds used to com-
plete the acquisition,42 but such reimbursement does not normally include a
portion of the increased value of the property.43 Even reimbursement is ap-
parently unavailable in Missouri, where the use of marital funds to satisfy the
indebtedness on the separate property acquired before marriage is only a "fac-
tor" to be considered in making a distribution of marital property.44 In either
event, it could be argued that the nonowner spouse had made a gift of marital
property to the separate estate of the other.
4 5
A reasonable basis exists, however, for rejecting the inception of title rule
in North Carolina. G.S. 50-20(b)(2) states in part that "property acquired by
gift from the other spouse during the course of the marriage shall be consid-
ered separate property only if such an intention is stated in the conveyance.
46
Since the application of marital funds to satisfy indebtedness on separate
property would virtually never satisfy this statutory requirement, the funds so
used should be considered marital property, not a gift to the other spouse.47 In
short, adoption of the inception of title rule would seem to contravene the
express statutory presumption that ordinary interspousal gifts are marital
property.4
8
A generally less rigid and better accepted resolution of this problem is
provided by the "source of funds" rule. Under this approach, property is
deemed to have been acquired as it is paid for, so that it includes both marital
and separate ownership interests. 49 The source of funds rule has been particu-
larly well developed in California:
ever, the court held that the contribution of the wife's efforts in her husband's separately owned
business had transmuted the property to marital.
42. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 39, at 133. See also Comment, supra note 3, at
1377.
43. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1377. The result is that the marital community has in
effect made an interest-free loan to the separate estate of one spouse throughout the marriage.
44. Stark v. Stark, 539 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). It should be noted that the Missouri
statute lists as a factor to be considered in property distribution "[t]he contribution of each spouse
to the acquisition of the marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as a home-
maker." Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.330.1(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981). The North Carolina provision is
similar. See supra note 16. In Stark, however, the property was separate, not marital, so that
reimbursement was clearly not an option foreclosed by the statute. Had the property at issue in
Stark constituted the only major asset of the parties, there presumably would have been no source
from which the nontitled spouse could have been adequately compensated.
45. Such a result would not be uncommon under community property law. See Schwartz v.
Schwartz, 52 Ariz. 105, 79 P.2d 501 (1938); Overton v. Benton, 60 N.M. 348, 291 P.2d 636 (1955).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
47. As the Supreme Court of Illinois concluded in a similar situation, "[i]t may be anachro-
nistic now to refer to an intent to convey a gift to the other spouse, but it is not improper to refer to
an intent to convey a gift to the marriage." In re Marriage of Rogers, 85 Ill. 2d 217, 223, 422
N.E.2d 635, 638 (1981). Seealsolnre Marriage of Emken, 86 IlL. 2d 164,166,427 N.E.2d 125, 126
(1981).
48. For further discussion of the interspousal gift provision, see infra text accompanying
notes 104-10. At a minimum it would seem that the interspousal gift provision requires that the
marital estate receive reimbursement for use of marital funds to reduce indebtedness on separately
owned property.
49. Krauskopf, supra note 39, at 180.
19831
NORTH CAROLINA L,W REVIEW[
If community funds are used to pay part of the purchase price on
property acquired by one spouse prior to marriage, the property can-
not be considered wholly community. . . . The community has a
pro lanto interest in such property in the ratio that the payments on
the purchase price made with community funds bears to the pay-
ments made with separate funds. . . . If the fair market value has
increased disproportionately to the increase in equity, the community
is entitled to participate in that increase in a similar proportion.50
The source of funds rule is premised on the realities of marital relation-
ships, and on the proposition that it is fundamentally unfair to allow a spouse
to claim, upon divorce, that property is separate when the property was clearly
regarded as marital throughout the marriage.51 It is also rooted in what has
been characterized as a "dynamic" rather than static interpretation of the term
acquisition.52 In Tibbetts v. Tibbels,53 for example, the Supreme Court of
Maine debated the relative merits of the inception of title and source of funds
rules and concluded that:
Where the marital estate chooses to invest its funds in certain prop-
erty together with non-marital funds, .... in fairness to both
spouses "acquisition" must not arbitrarily and finally be fixed on the
date that a legal obligation to purchase is created. . . . Rather, "ac-
quisition" should be recognized as the on-going process of making
payment for acquired property.
54
Such reasoning has apparently persuaded a growing number of classification-
based states to adopt the source of funds theory in this context and in other
situations as well.55 Most notably, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has
adopted this approach recently, relying upon the Tibbetts concept of acquisi-
tion as an ongoing process.
56
50. In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 256-57, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483, 491 (1972).
See also In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980).
51. It has been persuasively argued that marital property law does affect the behavior of
spouses during marriage and that a system that dictates
[t]hat a married person behave as if unmarried with respect to certain choices or suffer
the consequences of subsequent property disadvantage for not doing so . . . works to
reward self-interested choices which can be detrimental to the continuation of the mar-
riage. At the same time it punishes conduct of accommodation and compromise so im-
portant to furthering and preserving the relationship.
Prager, supra note 3, at 12. If marital partnership is the ideal that the law should seek to foster,
incentives to sharing should be encouraged, while incentives to the diversion of marital funds to
the aggrandizement of separate property should be minimized.
52. Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70, 75 (Me. 1979).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 77.
55. See, eg., Newman v. Newman, 597 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1980); Schmitz v. Schmitz, 309
N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1981); Scherzer v. Schemer, 136 N.J. Super. 397, 356 A.2d 434 (1975); In re
Marriage of Gerlitz, 50 Or. App. 443, 623 P.2d 1088 (1981). See also discussion of increases in
value infra text accompanying notes 81-88.
56. Harper v. Harper, - Md. App. -, 448 A.2d 916 (1982). In Harper the husband con-
tended that a tract of land, bought before but paid for during a 29 year marriage, plus a house
built on the land, were separate property. The court of appeals concluded that only the source of




The source of funds approach is, moreover, remarkably simple to apply.
The courts of Kentucky, for example, have reduced proportionment of marital
and separate shares to an easy and workable formula,57 in which the ratio
between the nonmarital contribution58 and the total contribution, multiplied
by the total equity, equals the nonmarital property proportion. Similarly, the
ratio between the marital contribution59 and the total contribution, multiplied
by the total equity, yields the marital proportion. The ultimate ratio of sepa-
rate to marital property simply reflects the relative contributions of the spouses
to the property's acquisition.60
In view of the North Carolina rule that increases in value of separate
property shall be separate, 61 it is also important to realize that this use of the
source of funds theory does not result in the treatment of increases in the value
of separate property as marital. Rather, the marital partnership is deemed
simply to share in increases in value of property that it has proportionately
acquired in its own right. 62 Furthermore, the source of funds approach ap-
pears to give a flexible and reasonable definition of the term "acquired" that
fully comports with the expectations of parties to marriage and that steers a
middle course between the inception of title rule and what is yet a third ap-
proach to this problem, the "transmutation through commingling" theory.
The transmutation theory of equitable distribution is particularly well devel-
oped in Illinois,63 although it is not unique to that state.64
After numerous and hopelessly contradictory decisions from the courts of
57. See Woosnam v. Woosnam, 587 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Brandenburg v. Bran-
denburg, 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
58. The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Brandenburg Y. Brandenburg defined nonmarital con-
tributions as "the equity in the property at the time of the marriage, plus any amount expended
after marriage by either spouse from traceable nonmarital funds in the reduction of mortgage
principal, and/or the value of improvements made to the property from such nonmarital funds."
617 S.W.2d at 872.
59. The marital contribution is defined as "the amount expended after marriage from other
than nonmarital funds." Id.
60. Thus, a $20,000 marital contribution divided by a $50,000 total contribution, the quotient
multiplied by a $100,000 total equity, would yield a marital property share of the property of
$40,000. That marital share would then be subject to division in a manner that the court deems
equitable. If it is equally divided, then the titled spouse would receive $60,000 (nonmarital share)
plus $20,000 (marital share) for a total of $80,000.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
62. By the same logic, G.S. 50-20(c)(8), which lists as a distributional factor "[a]ny direct
contribution to an increase in value of separate property," should likewise not be interpreted to
bar the adoption of the source of funds rule in North Carolina. For further discussion see infra
text accompanying notes 92-96.
63. Illinois also applies the approach to sole proprietorships and closely held corporations to
which marital funds or efforts have been contributed. See, e.g., Westphal v. Westphal, 99 Ill. App.
3d 1042, 426 N.E.2d 303 (1981); cases cited supra at note 54. See also In re Marriage of Kennedy,
94 Ill. App. 3d 537, 418 N.E.2d 947 (1981) (finding insufficient evidence of commingling to trans-
mute an entire business to marital property, but nonetheless finding that the stores acquired after
the marriage were marital property, while those held at the time of the marriage remained
separate).
64. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Altman, 35 Colo. App. 183, 530 P.2d 1012 (1974) (rejecting
husband's argument that a home he bought in his name a few days prior to marriage was separate
property and holding instead that it was marital property). See also Darling v. Darling, 444 A.2d
20 (D.C. 1982) (holding that wife's efforts in her husband's separately owned business had trans-
muted it to marital property).
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appeals, 65 the Supreme Court of Illinois rejected both the inception of title
rule and the mixed title approach inherent in the source of funds rule.
66 It
relied instead on the community property doctrine of transmutation 67 to hold
that when property that is held in the name of one spouse is commingled with
marital property or with nonmarital property of the other spouse, the resulting
asset is presumptively marital property in its entirety.68
Because other states have made extensive use of the transmutation theory,
particularly in the context of gifts, when marital and nonmarital assets are
commingled, 69 the logic upon which the Illinois Supreme Court rested its con-
clusion warrants careful analysis. It reasoned first that the presumption of
marital property and the underlying purposes of equitable distribution evinced
a legislative preference for the classification of property as marital.70 More
significantly, it concluded that, although the Illinois statute clearly intended
that separate property should be allowed to retain its separate character, the
"affirmative act of augmenting nonmarital property by commingling it with
marital property" was indicative of an intent to transmute such separate prop-
erty to marital.71 As a lower court had previously concluded:
To hold that where one spouse owned the residence prior to mar-
riage, the residence is nonmarital property of which the other spouse
is entitled to nothing despite significant contributions is to guarantee
an unequitable distribution of property in contravention of the pur-
pose of the statute. Further, such a reading of the statute would have
the anomalous effect of transforming marital property into
nonmarital property . . . . We do not believe the legislature in-
tended to create such a loophole from which manifestly inequitable
results could frequently occur.
72
65. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Atkinson, 82 Ill. App. 3d 617, 402 N.E.2d 831 (1980). In re
Marriage of Dietz, 76111. App. 3d 1029, 395 N.E.2d 762 (1979);Inre Marriage of Key, 71111. App.
3d 727,389 N.E.2d 963 (1979); Klingberg v. Klingberg, 68 I. App. 3d 513, 386 N.E.2d 517 (1979).
66. In re Marriage of Smith, 86 Ill. 2d 518, 427 N.E.2d 1239 (198 ). See also In re Marriage
of Lee, 87 Il1. 2d 64, 430 N.E.2d 1030 (1981).
67. Transmutation refers to a change in the character of property from separate to marital,
based upon agreement, either express or implied, or upon a gift between the spouses. See Stock-
dale v. Stockdale, - Idaho -, 643 P.2d 82 (1982). Probably the most common means of transmu-
tation is commingling of marital and separate assets.
68. Inre Marriage of Smith, 86 I. 2d 518, 427 N.E.2d 1239 (1981). See also In re Marriage
of Lee, 87 I1. 2d 64, 430 N.E.2d 1030 (1981) (holding that improvements to separate property
evidenced an intent to transmute); Inre Marriage of Emken, 86 I. 2d 164,427 N.E.2d 125 (1981)
(depositing separate funds into joint account transmuted property to marital); In re Marriage of
Jones, 104 Ii. App. 3d 490, 432 N.E.2d 1113 (1982) (commingling of separate and marital busi-
nesses transmuted them to marital property).
69. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Altman, 35 Colo. App. 183, 530 P.2d 1012 (1974); Darling v.
Darling, 444 A.2d 20 (D.C. 1982); Harper v. Harper, - Md. App. -, 448 A.2d 916 (1982).
70. Inre Marriage of Smith, 86 Il. 2d 518, 531, 427 N.E.2d 1239, 1245 (1981). It also relied
upon the use of the definite article in the phrase "the marital property" to indicate a legislative
intent to adopt a "unitary" concept of property. Id at 530, 427 N.E.2d at 1245. Thus separate
property cannot be "traced out" of transmuted property in Illinois. id. The unitary property
concept has also been used in a different context in Missouri. See discussion infra at note 80.
71. 86 Ill. 2d at 532, 427 N.E.2d at 1246.
72. In re Marriage of Lee, 88 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1047, 410 N.E.2d 1183, 1185 (1980), aj'd, 87
Ill.2d 64, 430 N.E.2d 1030 (1981).
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Separate property contributions may not, of course, be "traced out" of
property that has become marital.7 3 Nonetheless, as the Illinois Supreme
Court has recognized, the possibilities for inequitable results are far less with
its solution than with the inception of title approach: "even where the contri-
bution of one partner is insignificant, the possibility of the ultimate property
division being inequitable is far less where commingled property is presumed
marital rather than nonmarital, since the pool of marital property available for
division is greater."7 4
In summary, three theories have evolved for classification of property to
which legal title is taken before marriage but which is paid for during mar-
riage with marital funds. Both the transmutation and source of funds ap-
proaches are consistent with the probable intentions of parties during marriage
and with the general goal of fairness implemented by the equitable distribu-
tion scheme. The inception of title rule, on the other hand, has little to offer
beyond a literalistic interpretation of the word "acquired." This is especially
true in North Carolina, where the opportunities for genuinely equitable distri-
butions of property are already severely curtailed by the narrow definition of
marital property, and where interspousal gifts, including the use of marital
funds to augment separate property, are presumptively marital in any case.
75
Adoption of a source of funds approach would create the opportunity to in-
crease the available pool of marital assets in a manner consistent with the
intentions of the parties and the legislature, and the underlying purposes of the
statute.7
6
C. Increases in Value of Separate Property
The issues raised with classification of increases in value of separate prop-
erty are very similar to those encountered with property acquired before mar-
riage. Here, however, the focus is on increases in value of property that was
paid for or acquired in such a manner as to leave no doubt about its wholly
separate character.7 7 In the great majority of common-law classification-
based states, only the increase in value of property that was acquired before
73. The "unitary" concept of property in Illinois mandates this result. See supra note 69. See
also In re Marriage of Cleveland, 99 Ill. App. 3d 293, 425 N.E.2d 475 (1981); Klingberg v.
Klingberg, 68 Ill. App. 3d 513, 386 N.E.2d 517 (1979).
74. In re Marriage of Smith, 86 II. 2d 518, 531, 427 N.E.2d 1239, 1245 (1981). Moreover,
under Illinois statutory law, one of the factors to be considered in distribution is the "contribution
or dissipation of each party in the acquisition. . . of the marital and nonmarital property." ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1980).
75. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 7-14.
76. Nothing contained in G.S. 50-20 stands in the way of such an interpretation. Subsection
(c)(6), directing the court to consider as a factor in the division of property "[any equitable claim
to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property
by the party not having title," cannot be interpreted as a contrary directive, since it speaks only to
such contributions to the acquisition of "marital property." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(b) (Cum.
Supp. 1981).
77. There is, of course, a considerable overlap between these two areas, but the characteriza-
tion of the increased value of an asset does not affect the underlying classification of the asset
itself.
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marriage is treated as separate property.78 Under the North Carolina statute,
in contrast, all increases in value of all separate properties are immune from
distribution.79 Regardless of whether the exclusion extends to increases in
value of all or only certain types of separate property, the underlying issues
are the same.
The three approaches used to classify property acquired before marriage
can also be used to determine the status of increases in value of separate prop-
erty. In practice, however, a fairly uniform treatment of such increases has
evolved in both common-law and community property states. Missouri ap-
pears to be the only common-law state to hold that the entire increase in value
of property acquired before marriage remains separate, regardless of the
source of that increase.
80
The overwhelming majority of classification-based states, however, have
adopted a less rigid approach to increases in value. Using what is essentially a
source of funds analysis, they draw a common-sense distinction between in-
creases in value due to general economic factors, such as inflation, and in-
creases due to the contributions, monetary or otherwise, from the marital unit
or the nontitled spouse.81 Increases in value that are attributable solely to
78. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(b)(3) (1981) (excluding the "increase in value of
property acquired prior to the marriage"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a)(5) (Smith-Hurd 1980)
(excluding "increase in value of property acquired before the marriage"); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 403.190(2)(e) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (excluding from marital property increases in value of property
acquired before marriage "to the extent that such increases in value of property did not result
from the efforts of the parties during marriage"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722A(2)(E)
(1964) ("increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage"); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 452.330.2(5) (1977 & Supp. 1982) ("increase in value of property acquired prior to the mar-
riage"). The New York statute includes a similar provision: separate property includes "property
acquired in exchange for or the increase in value of separate property, except to the extent that
such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse." NY. DOM.
REL. LAW § 236 (d)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Since community property states also
provide for some increases in the value of separate property to be marital property, North Caro-
lina would appear to be the only state in the union with such a sweeping definition of increases in
value as separate property. See W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 39, at 170-71 for a
discussion of the community property rules regarding increases in value of separate property. See
also discussion infra text accompanying notes 86-88.
80. Hull v. Hull, 591 S.W.2d 376 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). In Hull, the court of appeals con-
cluded that the "statutory directives for identification of marital and nonmarital property do not
... contemplate any subclassification whereby an asset in part partakes of the attributes of
nonmarital property and in part is considered marital property." Id. at 381. Therefore, the entire
increase in value of property acquired before marriage was held to be separate. The holding is, of
course, consistent with the inception of title rule previously adopted in Missouri. See supra note
41. See also Null v. Null, 608 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that separate real prop-
erty remained separate despite the fact that its value was increased by the use of marital funds and
efforts in constructing a house upon it)..
81. See, e.g., Cockrill v. Cockrill, 124 Ariz. 50, 601 P.2d 1334 (1979); Brandenburg v. Bran-
denburg, 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Downs v. Downs, 410 So. 2d 793 (La. Ct. App.
1982); Schmitz v. Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1981); Johnson v. Johnson, 89 Nev. 244, 510
P.2d 625 (1973); Mol v. Mol, 147 N.J. Super. 5, 370 A.2d 509 (App. Div. 1977); Jolis v. Jolis, 111
Misc. 2d 965, 446 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Moyers v. Moyers, 372 P.2d 844 (Okla. 1962); In
re Marriage of Gerlitz, 50 Or. App. 443, 623 P.2d 1088 (1981); Leeper v. Leeper. 301 N.W.2d 154
(S.D. 1981); Wachendorfer v. Wachendorfer, 615 S.W.2d 852 (rex. Civ. App. 1981). See also
Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70 (Me. 1979), discussed supra text accompanying notes 52-54. As
one recent Iowa opinion concluded, "[t]he underlying premise of our analysis is that an equitable
property division of the appreciated value of the property should be a function of the tangible
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external economic factors, and therefore result in no depletion of the marital
estate, are deemed separate property. On the other hand, increases that result
from contributions that belonged to and which would otherwise have aug-
mented the marital estate are held to be marital property.82 In Illinois such
increases in value are said to result from a commingling of marital and sepa-
rate property, so that if the marital contribution is sufficiently substantial, the
entire asset is rebuttably presumed to be transmuted to marital property.
83
This transmutation result has also been reached in the District of Columbia.
84
More often, increases in value derived from joint efforts are regarded as prop-
erty acquired by both spouses during the marriage.85
In either instance, the critical inquiry is whether the marital contribution
is sufficiently substantial to warrant inclusion of the increase in value, or inclu-
sion of the entire asset, as marital property.8 6 In community property states,
this has been termed the "all or nothing" approach, since increases in value
would either be entirely separate or entirely marital property.8 7 In fact, most
increases in value derive from both general economic factors (that is, from the
separate property itself) and from marital contributions. In recognition of this,
several states, including at least two community property jurisdictions, appor-
tion the increase in value between the marital and separate estates based on
the relative contribution of each to the increase.
88
Despite the apparently absolute language of G.S. 50-20(b)(2), the source
of funds approach is a viable option for classification of increases in value of
separate property in North Carolina. The distinction drawn by the great ma-
contributions of each party. In re Marriage of Lattig, 318 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Iowa Ct. App.
1982).
82. Of course, if separate property is increased in value through the use of separate funds, the
increase would remain separate under this analysis.
83. In re Marriage of Lee, 87 IU. 2d 64,430 N.E.2d 1030 (1981). In Lee a residence owned by
the husband prior to marriage was improved with $20,000 in marital funds. The court rejected his
argument that this fell within the statutory exclusion from marital property. See also In re Mar-
riage of Smith, 86 IUI. 2d 518, 427 N.E.2d 1239 (1981).
84. Darling v. Darling, 444 A.2d 20 (D.C. 1982) (holding that husband's separate business
had become marital due to wife's substantial contributions to it).
85. See cases cited supra note 81.
86. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Kennedy, 94 Ill. App. 3d 537, 418 N.E.2d 947 (1981); Jolis v.
Jolis, 111 Misc. 2d 965, 446 N.Y.S.2d 138, 147 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (holding wife's efforts at increasing
the value of husband's stock in leparate business were "indirect" and not substantial); Jensen v.
Jensen, 629 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982). The Oklahoma Court of Appeals has stated that
increases in value are only to be considered marital property if there is proof of "(1) significant
repairs which materially enhance life expectancy of asset; (2) improvements made which materi-
ally contribute to increase in value; and (3) material increase in equity since marriage [not due
solely to inflation]." Bowman v. Bowman, 639 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
87. See cases cited infra note 88.
88. Cockrill v. Cockrill, 124 Ariz. 50, 601 P.2d 1334 (1979) (also abandoning the all or noth-
ing rule and holding that the burden of proof is on the spouse who claims an increase is separate
property to prove that such increase was not the product of marital efforts); In re Marriage of
Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1981); Cord v. Neuhoff, 94 Nev. 21, 573
P.2d 1170 (1978); Johnson v. Johnson, 89 Nev. 244, 510 P.2d 625 (1973) (abandoning the old "all
or nothing" rule whereby increases in value of separate property were either all marital or all
separate). This is apparently also the rule in New York. See Kobylack v. Kobylack, 110 Misc. 2d
402,-, 442 N.Y.S.2d 392, 394 (1981) (judicial distribution of marital property based solely upon
the "relative economic contributions" of the parties). As already noted, Kentucky has developed a
workable apportionment formula. See discussion supra at notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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jority of states is, with two exceptions, 8 9 the product of judicial interpretation.
It is based on the simple fairness principle that no distribution can be equita-
ble unless it reflects on the contributions of each party.90
Subsection (c)(8) of the North Carolina statute, however, raises greater
difficulties, because it lists "fa]ny direct contribution to an increase in value of
separate property which occurs during the course of the marriage" as a factor
to be considered in distribution.91 The question thus arises whether a distribu-
tional factor should be used to expand the definition of separate property, that
is, whether subsection (c)(8) should be interpreted to preclude a result other-
wise allowable under G.S. 50-20(b)(2). Although the issue is a troublesome
one, it is nonetheless possible to argue that this factor should not have such an
effect.
As a general proposition, distributional factors should not take on the
status of independent principles of law. They come into play only in the event
that a judge decides that an equal distribution would not be equitable.
92
Thus, a decision to divide property equally requires only that marital and sep-
arate property be identified, and the North Carolina definition of separate
property can easily accommodate the source of increased value distinction
used in virtually all other states. Similar language in the Illinois statute has
been held to mean only that "under the circumstances of a particular case, it is
possible for one spouse to improve the other spouse's nonmarital property
without making that property marital."93
Furthermore, the absence of any clear meaning of the word "direct" in
subsection (c)(8) indicates that courts should be hesitant to interpret that factor
in such a manner as to expand the definition of separate property. 94 For in-
stance, although a straightforward interpretation of "direct" would appear to
include the contribution by one spouse of funds used to enhance the value of
property belonging to the other spouse, such a result would contravene the
interspousal gift provisions of section (b)(2).
95
A fully satisfactory resolution of the difficulties posed by subsection (c)(8)
may require amendment of the statute. In the absence of such legislative ac-
tion, however, it should be possible to limit the operation of this subsection to
the situation in which one spouse's contribution to the increased value of the
89. These states are Kentucky and New York. See supra note 78.
90. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lattig, 318 N.W.2d 811 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(8) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
92. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
93. In re Marriage of Kennedy, 94 Ill. App. 3d 537, 547, 418 N.E.2d 947, 954-55 (1981)
(coistruing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1980)).
94. Apparently no other state has drawn this distinction. The Texas Court of Appeals has
drawn a distinction between increases in value derived from a nontitled spouse's labor (for which
no reimbursement was allowed) and increases derived from the nontitled spouse's expenditure of
separate funds. Hale v. Hale, 557 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). But this distinction appears
to have been considerably weakened in Wachendorfer v. Wachendorfer, 615 S.W.2d 852 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1981) (stating court could not say whether under Texas law a spouse could recover for
his or her contribution of community labor to the enhanced value of the other spouse's separate
property).
95. See discussion supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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other's separate property is not sufficiently substantial to warrant treatment of
the increased value of the property, or the entire property itself, as marital.
96
An ambiguous distributional factor should not be allowed to foreclose an eq-
uitable interpretation of separate property otherwise permissible under the
statute.
D. Property Acquired by Gif, Bequest, Devise, or Descent
The exclusion from marital property of assets acquired by a spouse by
bequest, devise, descent, or gift is common to virtually all classification-based
states, including North Carolina. 97 Unlike gifts from a spouse, to which the
exclusion is not applicable, gifts from third parties generally cause few difficul-
ties. Wedding gifts, for instance, are normally presumed to be marital prop-
erty, unless they are specifically earmarked for one spouse or are suitable for
one spouse only.98 Where a gift or devise is made to both spouses, it appears
that title generally will control, so that the property thus acquired will be pre-
sumed to be marital.99 The presumption may occasionally be overcome by
proof of a contrary intent underlying the gift, devise, or bequest.l1°
Gifts between spouses present considerably more difficult issues. Beyond
the normal pr.blems associated with proof of the prerequisites of inter vivos
gifts, however, an important issue within the interspousal gifts context is
whether the gift becomes the separate property of the donee or marital prop-
erty. Although some community property states consider interspousal gifts to
be the separate property of the donee in certain circumstances, 101 the majority
of common-law classification-based states presume that gifts between spouses
are marital property.' 02 This presumption may be overcome, usually by
proof of lack of donative intent.
10 3
G.S. 50-20(b)(2) also creates a presumption that gifts between spouses are
96. See cases cited supra note 81.
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
98. See, e.g., Darwish v. Darwish, 100 Mich. App. 758, 300 N.W.2d 399 (1980); Nehorayoffv.
Nehorayoff, 108 Misc. 2d 311, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1981); Avnet v. Avnet, 204 Misc. 760, 124
N.Y.S.2d 517 (1953).
99. In re Marriage of Lord, - Colo. App. -, 626 P.2d 698 (1980); Forsythe v. Forsythe, 558
S.W.2d 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (proceeds from $300,000 sale of property left to husband and wife
by wife's parents held to be marital property). But see Grant v. Grant, 424 A.2d 139, 143 n.3 (Me.
1981) (holding that property devised to husband and wife as joint tenants was not subject to
division; "title status produced through the instrumentality of a third party by way of 'gift, be-
quest, devise or descent' shall remain unaffected by the subsequent termination of a marriage").
100. See, e.g., Hull v. Hull, 591 S.W.2d 376 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); In re Marriage of Herron,
608 P.2d 97 (Mont. 1980).
101. Eg., Schwartz v. Schwartz, 52 Ariz. 105, 79 P.2d 501 (1939); Overton v. Overton, 60 N.M.
348, 291 P.2d 636 (1955).
102. See, eg., In re Marriage of Altman, 35 Colo. App. 183, 530 P.2d 1012 (1974); Halsey v.
Charlotte, 419 A.2d 962 (Del. Fain. Ct. 1980); In re Marriage of Emken, 86 11. 2d 164, 427 N.E.2d
125 (1981); Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018 (Me. 1980); Crawford v. Crawford, - Md. -, 443
A.2d 599 (1982); Conrad v. Bowers, 533 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Winpenny v. Winpenny,
- Pa. Super. -, 442 A.2d 778 (1982). See also N.Y. DOM. REL L. § 236(d)(1) (McKinney Supp.
198 1) (defining separate property to exclude interspousal gifts).
103. See, e.g., Melvin v. Melvin, 270 Ark. 522, 606 S.W.2d 90 (1980); Singleton v. Singleton,
525 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
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marital property. This same provision also creates a restricted means whereby
gifts may become the separate property of the donee: "the property acquired
by-gift from the other spouse during the course of the marriage shall be con-
sidered separate property only if such an intention is stated in theconveyance." 104
Although this provision raises a number of issues, 10 5 it is at least rela-
tively clear that most interspousal gifts will be presumed to be marital prop-
erty. The ramifications of this are particularly significant when separate funds
are deposited into a joint bank or savings account or are otherwise commin-
gled with marital assets. In such instances, the general rule is that there has
been a gift to the marital estate. 106 Even Missouri, an inception of title state,
holds that commingling.of marital and separate funds "is indicative of an in-
tent on the part of the 'owner of [separate property] to contribute it to the
marital estate."'
107
Whether North Carolina courts will adopt this rule depends on their in-
terpretation, in light of the new statute, of a long line of cases which hold that
placing funds into a joint account by one spouse does not constitute a gift to
the other spouse.' 08 Strictly speaking, such cases hold only that no gift to the
separate estate of the other spouse was intended because the owner of the
funds failed completely to divest himself of control over them. 0 9 This result
is not inconsistent with the narrowly circumscribed circumstances under which
a gift can be made to the separate estate of a spouse under the new statute. As
other states have recognized, the control element is an inappropriate test of the
intention to make a gift to the marital estate."10 Therefore, existing North
Carolina precedent would not seem to prohibit a finding that the deposit of
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
105. One of these problems is whether a separate gift can be made only by written convey-
ance, or whether, for instance, an oral gift of personalty made with appropriate language might
suffice. A further issue is whether a gift to separate property can be made from marital property
or only from separate property. In most common law states, a gift from marital property is not
likely to lose its marital character. See, e.g., Hemily v. Hemily, 403 A.2d 1139, 1143 (D.C. 1979)
(holding that if "property initially was acquired as 'marital property'. . . it will remain so . ..
notwithstanding any subsequent interchange between the two spouses"). See also In re Marriage
of Severns, 93 Ii. App. 3d 122, 416 N.E.2d 1235 (1981).
106. Wall v. Wall, 30 Cal. App. 3d 1042, 106 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1973); In re Marriage of Altman,
35 Colo. App. 183, 530 P.2d 1012 (1974); Darling v. Darling, 444 A.2d 20 (D.C. 1982); In re
Marriage of Smith, 86 Ill. 2d 518, 427 N.E.2d 1239 (1981); Turley v. Turley, 562 S.W.2d 665 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1978); Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018 (Me. 1980).
107. Jaeger v. Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). See also Anderson v. Ander-
son, 584 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Daniels v. Daniels, 557 S.W.2d 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
108. E.g., Smith v. Smith, 255 N.C. 152, 120 S.E.2d 575 (1961). The supreme court held in
Smith that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the person making a deposit in a bank is
deemed to be the owner of the fund. If a husband deposits his own money in a bank and the
money is entered upon the records of the bank in the name of the husband or his wife, it is still the
property of the husband." Id. at 154-55, 120 S.E.2d at 578. The wife in such a situation is deemed
her husband's agent, and not the joint owner of the funds. See also Overby v. Overby, 272 N.C.
636, 158 S.E.2d 799*(1968); McAuliffe v. Wilson, 41 N.C. App. 117, 254 S.E.2d 547 (1979).
109. Smith, 255 N.C. at 154-55, 120 S.E.2d at 578. See also Leatherman v. Leatherman, 297
N.C. 618, 624-25, 256 S.E.2d 793, 797 (1979).
110. See discussion supra note 102.
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separate funds into a joint account constitutes a gift to the marital estate, par-
ticularly since the statute itself presumes such a result.
E. Property Exchangedfor Separate Property
Interspousal gift issues become considerably more complex when the gift
is composed of property that was acquired in exchange for separate property.
Many classification-based states, including North Carolina, define separate
property to include any property "acquired in exchange for separate prop-
erty.""'I  A literal application of this rule would require that property ex-
changed for separate property be classified separate even if title to it were
taken in the name of the nonowner spouse or by both spouses jointly. 112 Such
an interpretation would have the effect of eliminating from marital property
any gift between the spouses if the gift property could be traced, through ex-
changes, to separate property. No jurisdiction has been willing to hold that its
legislature could have intended such an extraordinary result.
The issue has arisen most frequently when separate property has been
exchanged for new property that is then transferred to the spouses as tenants
by the entirety, and the transferor spouse claims that the property should, by
virtue of the exchange exclusion, be considered separate property. The con-
tention has been uniformly rejected. In the leading case of Lucas v. Lucas," 1
3
for instance, the California Supreme Court held that the "act of taking title in
a joint and equal ownership form is inconsistent with an intention to preserve
a separate property interest." ' 1 4 The Illinois Supreme Court also relied upon
the affirmative act of placing title in joint names and the simultaneous failure
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50"20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981). It should be noted; however, that the
North Carolina exclusion is again more sweeping than that of any other state. Illinois, Kentucky,
Maine, and Missouri exclude from marital property only "property acquired in exchange for
property acquired before the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, de-
vise or descent." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 403.190(2)(b) (Supp. 1980); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(2)(B) (1964); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 452.330.2(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982). Delaware excludes only property acquired in exchange for
property acquired prior to the marriage. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(b)(1) (1981). New York
excludes "property acquired in exchange for or the increase in value of separate property, except
to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other
spouse." N.Y. DOM. REL. L. § 236(d)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1981-82). Pennsylvania excludes
property "acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage except for the increase
in value during the marriage." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(e)(l) (Purdon Supp. 1982-83).
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981). This section states that "[p]roperty
acquired in exchange for separate property shall be considered separate property regardless of
whether the title is in the name of the husband or wife or both." The combination of a strict
interpretation of this provision with an inception of title rule would be catastrophic. For example,
if Husband buys a house with separate funds for $4,000 down, lives in it with Wife for 20 years,
then sells it for $80,000, and reinvests that money in a second home, taken as tenants by the
entirety, the second home would be the separate property of Husband.
113. 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
114. Id. at 815, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857. The court also held that only proof of a
common agreement or understanding to the contrary would rebut the presumption that the speci-
fied ownership interest is intended. See also In re Marriage of Hayden, 124 Cal. App. 3d 72, -,
177 Cal. Rptr. 183, 185 (1981) (applying Lucas to joint bank accounts and stating that "since title
to the family residence was taken as community property, the presumption of equal ownership
arising therefrom may be overcome only by specific evidence showing a contrary agreement or
understanding between the parties").
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to preserve the separate nature of the exchanged property by segregating it, in
holding that a marital home in joint tenancy is presumed "in fact" to be mari-
tal property." t5 The same conclusion has been reached in Colorado, Maine,
New Jersey, and many other states."
6
Significantly, even Missouri has joined the majority of states on this issue.
In the leading case of Conrad v. Bowers,"t 7 the court concluded that "if the
presumption of gift could be overcome merely by proof that the jointly held
property had been acquired in exchange for separate property, then a spouse
owning property prior to the marriage could exchange that property, place
such exchanged property in joint names, and after many years of a happy
marriage, defeat the right of the other spouse in such property. . . .We be-
lieve the general assembly could not have intended such a result.""t 8 The
court went on to hold that the presumption of a gift to marital property could
be overcome only when "(1) it is shown that the property acquired subsequent
io the marriage was acquired in exchange for [separate] property ...and
(2) it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the transfer was not in-
115. In re Marriage of Rogers, 85 111. 2d 217, 223, 422 N.E.2d 635, 638 (1981). See also In re
Marriage of Smith, 86 Ill. 2d 518, 427 N.E. 2d 1239 (1981). In Smith the Illinois Supreme Court
specifically addressed the exchange issue in these terms: "Clearly if after the exchange the prop-
erty is segregated from the marital assets and held in the acquiring spouse's name alone. . . the
property [will] be classified as nonmarital. Where, however, the spouse has failed to segregate the
property during the marriage, we conclude that. . .[the property is marital]." Id. at 530, 427
N.E.2d at 1245.
Prior to the supreme court decisions in Smith and Rogers, a split of major proportions existed
among the appellate courts in Illinois. One appellate court, for example, held that the new act had
destroyed the presumption of gift between the spouses in this situation. In re Marriage of Dietz,
76 IlL App. 3d 1029, 395 N.E.2d 762 (1979). See also In re Marriage of Preston, 81 111. App. 3d
672,402 N.E.2d 963 (1980); In re Marriage of Key, 71 Ill. App. 3d 722, 389 N.E.2d 963 (1979). In
Rogers, however, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the new Act did "not purport .. to
change the law regarding interspousal transfers of property owned individually. It does not indi-
cate, by implication or otherwise, any dissatisfaction with prior cases in which the intention of a
spouse conveying property was ascertained." 85 I11. 2d at 222-23, 422 N.E.2d at 637. Therefore,
the court concluded that "a marital residence owned by both spouses, even if one spouse has
furnished all of the consideration for it out of nonmarital funds, will be presumed 'in fact' as
marital property, absent convincing rebutting evidence." Id. at 223, 422 N.E.2d at 638.
116. In In re Marriage of Moncrief, 36 Colo. App. 140, 535 P.2d 1137 (1975), the court specifi-
cally rejected the husband's exchange argument and found that when a house bought with sepa-
rate funds is placed in joint names, a gift to the marital estate will be presumed. The Supreme
Court of Maine reached the same conclusion, relying on the common law presumption of gift and
on the nature of marriage as a partnership. In Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018 (Me. 1980), the
court concluded that a contrary result would require a court "to ignore the couple's recognition of
their partnership and the fact of the joint tenancy by awarding all of the property to the spouse
who originally provided funds for its purchase. If that were the result, the other spouse would be
worse off than under the prior law despite the 'remedial' nature of the marital property statute,
which was designed 'to provide a more equitable method of distributing property upon the termi-
nation ofmarriage.' Id. at 1022-23 (quoting Fournier v. Fournier, 376 A.2d 100, 102 (Me. 1977)
(emphasis in original)). See also Becehelli v. Becehelli, 17 Ariz. App. 280, 497 P.2d 396 (1972);
Husband R.T.G. v. Wife G.K.G., 410 A.2d 155 (Del. 1979); Turpin v. Turpin, 403 A.2d 1144
(D.C. 1979); Canova v. Canova, 146 N.J. Super. 58, 368 A.2d 971 (1976) (discussed infra text
accompanying note 122); May v. May, 596 P.2d 536 (Okla. 1979) (cotenants); Winpenny v.
Winpenny, - Pa. Super. -, 442 A.2d 778 (1982) (per curiam) (personal property); Tyler v. Tyler,
624 P.2d 784 (Wyo. 1981).




tended as a ... gift to the other spouse."" 9
Thus the unanimous conclusion of other states is that property acquired
in exchange for separate property may retain its separate character if its owner
so intends.' 20 If, however, the owner of that substitute property makes a gift
of it, by transferring ownership to a tenancy by the entirety, his intention at the
time that estate is created must be controlling.' 2 ' A contrary holding would,
as a New Jersey court concluded, "make a nullity of every interspousal gift the
funds for which could be traced to the funds owned by the donor."'122 Since
most gift property can, by its very nature, be traced to some separate property
source, the nonsensical result would be that only giftsfrom marital property
traced to some separate property could be marital property, a result clearly not
intended under the exchange provision of any state.
Unfortunately, the North Carolina exchange provision lends itself to just
such an interpretation. Section (b)(2) states that "[p]roperty acquired in ex-
change for separate property shall be considered separate property regardless
of whether the title is in the name of the husband or wife or both." 123 In Mirs
v. Mims,124 a case involving a divorce granted before the effective date of the
new statute, the North Carolina Supreme Court cautioned that it did not in-
tend "definitely to construe" the interspousal gift or exchange provisions.' 25
Nonetheless, it said in dicta that "in the context of a divorce and the 'equitable
distribution' of all 'marital property' the legislature has opted for a rule that
where land or personalty is purchased with the 'separate property' of either
spouse, it remains the 'separate property' of that spouse regardless of how the
title is made."' 126 Application of the dictum in Mims would clearly have the
119. Id.
120. In In re Marriage of Smith, 86 Ill. 2d 518, 427 N.E.2d 1239 (1981), for example, the
Supreme Court of Illinois concluded that the exchange provision was a manifestation of "the
legislative purpose to preserve the character of non-marital property in those situations where the
actions of the parties have not created ambiguity." Id. at 530, 427 N.E.2d at 1245 (emphasis
added).
121. In In re Marriage of Preston, 81 Ill. App. 3d 672, 402 N.E.2d 332 (1980), which was
overruled in In re Marriage of Smith, 86 Ill. 2d 518, 427 N.E.2d 1239 (1981), Judge Kasserman
disagreed with the majority's holding that property acquired in exchange for separate property
retained its separate identity even though a transfer to joint title had been made. With persuasive
logic he argued that:
By what I believe to be an illogical line of reasoning the majority states that while the
parties may intend to devote their separate property to their mutual welfare on a fifty-
fifty basis in a 'functioning marriage,' when the 'union has faltered' either spouse may
then disregard this intent and nullify a written transfer or conveyance of property. Such
an approach to this problem lacks the adhesiveness of reason. While recognizing that a
spouse whose funds are used to create a joint tenancy contemplates the marriage being a
'fifty-fifty proposition' at the time of the creation of the joint tenancy, the majority
reached the conclusion that such spouse should be capable of extracting from the mar-
riage any assets he is able to manipulate at the time of its dissolution.. . . The majority
fails to recognize that in instances in which a spouse creates a joint tenancy, the intent of
such spouse at the time of its creation is controlling.
81 11. App. 3d at 688, 402 N.E.2d at 344 (Kasserman, J., dissenting).
122. Canova, 146 N.J. Super. at 62, 368 A.2d at 973.
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
124. 305 N.C. 41, 286 S.E.2d 779 (1982).
125. Id at 53, 286 S.E.2d at 787.
126. Id. In Mins the husband had purchased a house in the entireties with money he had
1983]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
precise effect that all other states have deemed wholly unacceptable: inter-
spousal "gifts" would in effect be subject to defeasance at the time of divorce if
they could be traced to separate property. Since most separate property has, at
some point, been the product of an exchange for other separate property, there
could be virtually no gifts between spouses. This result could not have been
intended by the spouses at the creation of the joint tenancy, or by the legisla-
ture in enacting the statute.
Assuming, moreover, separate property existed that could not be shown to
be the product of an exchange for separate property, the following result
would follow:
Ex. I - Husband owns a home worth $70,000 which, for whatever
reasons, cannot be traced to an exchange of separate property. He
marries, then transfers title to the entireties. Since there has been no
actual exchange here, the property will be deemed a gift, and so will
be presumed to be marital property.
An insignificant factual variation produces the following bizarre result:
Ex. 2 - Husband has $70,000 in separate property. He marries, then
buys a house for that amount, title to which is taken in the entireties.
Since there has been an "exchange" of property for his separate
property, the house would remain part of his separate estate upon
divorce.
Allowing the ultimate classification of gift property to turn on whether
there was a gift of "simple" separate property or of property that had been the
subject of an exchange misconceives the basic nature of the issue. The critical
inquiry should be directed to whether or not a gft was made, not to whether
the underlying nature of the gift is separate or marital property. If a gift has
been made, then under the statute the property is presumed to be marital. If a
gift has not been made, then the property retains its separate identity.
Where, however, one spouse transfers property to the entireties, the issue
turns on his intent at the time of such transfer, and the North Carolina rule is
that a presumption of gift arises.' 27 As Mims recognized, the presumptive gift
rule is "more in accord with the probabilities of the marital state.'128 The
suggestion in Mims that the presumptive gift rule should not apply to equita-
ble distribution proceedings under the new statute is contrary to the probable
intent of the parties, the purposes of the new statute, and the result reached in
all other states. Any interpretation of the statute that would prohibit a spouse
from making an absolute inter vivos gift to the marital estate is simply
unreasonable.
inherited. Wife sought to take advantage of the gift presumption then operating only in favor of
wives. Husband contended that the property was his alone through application of the resulting
trust doctrine. The Supreme Court of North Carolina simply disapproved the theretofore unequal
presumptions and held that a gift would be presumed when either spouse transferred property to
the other. The presumption can be rebutted only by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that
he did not intend to make a gift of an entirety interest" at the time of the conveyance. Id. at 57-58,
286 S.E.2d at 790.
127. Id. at 53, 286 S.E.2d at 787.
128. Id. at 54, 286 S.E.2d at 788.
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F Pensions, Income from Separate Property, and Degrees
In addition to the broad exclusions from marital property already dis-
cussed, the North Carolina statute identifies three other types of separate prop-
erty. First, the statute states that "[v]ested pension or retirement rights and the
expectation of nonvested pension or retirement rights shall be considered sep-
arate property."' 129 Because pension rights are apt to be, except for a home,
the most significant asset acquired during a marriage,130 this exemption is par-
ticularly unfortunate. Moreover, to the extent that they were earned during
the marriage, pension benefits are clearly the product of marital efforts and
earnings.' 3 ' The inclusion of such benefits as a distributional factor in subsec-
tion (c) of the statute is hardly an adequate remedy for their omission from
marital property.'
32
North Carolina also exempts from distribution all "professional licenses
and business licenses which would terminate on transfer."' 133 The statute thus
reaches the same conclusion that most other states have obtained only after
extensive litigation.' 34 Once again, the "direct or indirect contribution made
by one spouse to help educate or develop the career potential of the other
spouse" is included as a distributional factor in subsection (c).' 35 This consid-
eration is likely to offer little solace in the circumstance, all too often encoun-
tered, of the wife who puts her husband through six years of medical school
only to find herself divorced prior to the accumulation of any substantial mari-
tal assets.
13 6
The failure of the North Carolina statute explicitly to subject a profes-
sional license or degree to division as marital property, however, does not con-
fer a similar immunity on a business or professional corporation founded
upon that license or degree. The great majority of classification-based states
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
130. Weitzman, supra note 32, at 1198. In the Weitzman study only 11% of divorcing women
interviewed in Los Angeles County, California had pension benefits in 1978, compared with 24%
of divorcing men; in general only women with incomes of $20,000 or more a year who had pen-
sions, and only 2% of all divorced women earned that much yearly income. Id. at 1198-99.
131. In Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115,437 A.2d 883 (1981), for instance, the court reviewed
the great number of cases from other jurisdictions dealing with pension rights and concluded that
such benefits are rightly viewed as "an economic resource acquired with the fruits of the wage
earner spouse's labors which would otherwise have been utilized by the parties during the mar-
riage to purchase other deferred income assets." Id. at -, 437 A.2d at 888.
132. G.S. 50-20 lists as a distributional factor "[v]ested pension or retirement rights and the
expectation of nonvested pension or retirements rights, which are separate property." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20(c)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
133. Id. § 50-20(b)(2).
134. See, e.., Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969); In re Marriage of
Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) (en banc); In re Marriage of McManama, - Ind. -,
399 N.E.2d 371 (1980); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Moss v. Moss,
80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978) (per curiam) ; Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1981); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980).
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
136. See, e.g., Roberto v. Brown, - Wis. 2d -, -, 318 N.W.2d 358, 360 (1982), (upholding
an award of 70% of the marital assets to a wife who had put her husband through medical school,
and noting that since she was entitled to 50% anyway, a mere 20% extra "seems insufficient com-
pensation in this case").
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have held that a professional corporation, including its goodwill value, is mar-
ital property, despite the fact that the professional degree itself remains sepa-
rate property.13 7 In addition, the future earning capacity of a spouse, although
not normally an asset subject to division,' 38 is a factor thdt other states com-
monly require to be considered in dividing property.'3 9 The "any other fac-
tor" language of subsection (c) clearly creates the opportunity for such a factor
to be taken into consideration in North Carolina as well.'
40
Finally, and perhaps most unfortunately, the North Carolina statute ex-
cludes from marital property any "income derived from separate property."
4'
A discussion of the implications of this section, including the various interpre-
tations that could be attached to the term "income," is beyond the scope of this
article. It would appear, however, that the phrase might well include interest
from separate funds, dividend payments, stock splits, and other forms of capi-
tal gains. Similarly, it would be logical to conclude that the term would not be
construed to include all "income" as defined by the Internal Revenue Code.
For example, finding that a spouse's salary, paid from a separately owned
business, was "income from separate property" and therefore immune from
distribution would make a mockery of the purposes of equitable distribution.
In fact, even the exclusion of interest or dividend payments does only slightly
less damage to the fairness goals embodied in the statute. "Income" from sep-
arate property can clearly be accumulated or invested (in property that would
also be separate in North Carolina) only if marital funds are used for non-
income producing purposes.'
42
There is little guidance for the interpretation or application of this section
because no other common-law state excludes income from separate prop-
erty.'43 In the relatively few cases that have considered the issue, income has
been held to be marital property. 144 In about half the community property
137. As an Illinois court concluded, "[wle are aware of no reason why the principles which
govern the disposition of a sole proprietorship or closed corporation should not apply to profes-
sional corporations. Neither do we perceive any economic or public policy reason why a profes-
sional corporation should not be treated as marital property." In re Marriage of White, 98 I11.
App. 3d 380, 382, 424 N.E.2d 421,423 (1981). See also Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d
115 (1981); In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979); Moss v.
Moss, 190 Colo. 491, 549 P.2d 404 (1976) (en banc); Stem v. Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A. 2d 257
(1975); Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980); In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or. App.
729, 557 P.2d 46 (1976).
138. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Goldstein, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981);
Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. App. 661, 365 N.E.2d 792 (1977); and Stem v. Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 331
A.2d 257 (1975). But see In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978) (holding
husband's future earning capacity as a lawyer was an asset subject to distribution).
139. See Note, Property Division and41imony Awards: 4 Survey of Statutory Limitations on
Judicial Discretion, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 415, 448 app. B (1981).
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(12) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
141. Id. § 50-20(b)(2).
142. In many instances marital funds are used for day-to-day living expenses precisely in or-
der to preserve income-producing property.
143. Only the Rhode Island statute mentions income from separate property, and it includes
such income as marital property. R.I. GEN. LAW § 15-5-16.1 (1981).
144. In re Neilson's Estate, 57 Cal. 2d 733, 371 P.2d 745, 22 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1962); In re Marriage




states the "fruits and profits" of separate property remain separate, but the
effect of such a rule in those states is considerably softened by the well estab-
lished doctrines of transmutation and commingling.' 45 In any event, it is
hoped that courts of this state will, consistent with the underlying purposes of
the statute, interpret the income provision as moderately as possible.
IV. CONCLUSION
It appears that the North Carolina statute is, to a considerable degree, at
war with itself. Many of its provisions embody the marital partnership ideal
that has provided the major impetus for enactment of equitable distribution
statutes. Marital property is defined broadly to include all property acquired
by either spouse during the marriage. Interspousal gifts, unless the donor
states a contrary intent, are deemed marital property. The distributional fac-
tors vest broad discretion in the judiciary to determine what constitutes an
equitable division of property.
At the same time, the statute expansively defines separate property and
immunizes it from distribution, so that the property available for distribution
will in many instances be so limited as to make the goal of fair distribution
impossible. Pension benefits, income from separate property, professional
licenses and degrees, and property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent
clearly are excluded from marital property. Provisions excluding property ac-
quired before marriage, increases in value of separate property, and property
exchanged for separate property are somewhat ambiguous, and certainly
should not be taken at face value. Nonetheless, they evince a strong legislative
intent to preserve to each spouse his or her separate property.
In effect, the statute indicates preferences for both marital and separate
property classifications. Fortunately, the dividing line between marital and
separate property is, in many instances, quite unclear. It remains for the judi-
ciary to delineate the precise boundaries between the classifications and to ef-
fect a reconciliation between the dual legislative purposes. Such a
reconciliation is possible only if the goal of restoring separate property is rec-
onciled with the more fundamental fairness purposes of the statute.
There are three propositions that can be of significant aid in balancing
these dual legislative goals. First, it is clear that the effectiveness of judicial
discretion as a tool for assuring equitable distribution of property is closely
related to the definition of marital property. The more narrowly marital assets
are defined, the more the function of the discretionary factors is undermined.
Second, the critical distinction between classification and actual distribution of
assets should not be overlooked. The initial classification of an asset as mari-
tal or separate should not be the vehicle for distribution of that asset. Classifi-
cation should be made without regard to the ultimate disposition of the
property. Only then can the discretionary factors function as they were clearly
intended to by the legislature.
145. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 39, at 161-62.
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Third, and most significantly, the classification-based system adopted in
North Carolina is premised upon the notion that fair distributions of property
must track the contributions of the parties to the acquisition of that property.
Separate property should be defined within the context of this goal, and with-
out reference to title. The significance of this is especially obvious with the
classification of property to which title vests in one spouse before marriage but
which is substantially paid for after marriage. Compelling reasons exist to
indicate that adoption of the source of funds rule for resolution of this prob-
lem would be consistent with both legislative intent and the expectations of the
parties. The truly reasonable basis for the statute's emphasis upon preserving
to each spouse his or her separate property is that the property was derived
from the resources of that spouse. When property is acquired with marital
rather than individual resources, this basis no longer exists, and classification
of the property as separate becomes arbitrary and contrary to legislative
purposes.
Only the letter of the law is served by an approach that fixes ownership of
property at the time title to it is "acquired." The great majority of states recog-
nize this fact and have interpreted statutes that are substantially similar to
North Carolina's in this respect to require adoption of the source of funds rule.
Enrichment of a separate estate through the use of marital funds clearly does
not reflect the intent of the parties during marriage. It should not be otherwise
upon divorce. The North Carolina presumption that interspousal gifts are
marital property, absent a specific statement of intent to the contrary, lends
even greater force to the argument for adoption of the source of funds ap-
proach in this state.
The same rationale suggests that the source of funds rule may also pro-
vide the most acceptable resolution of the problem created when increases in
value of separate property are substantially attributable to the expenditure of
the funds or efforts of the marital community or the nontitled spouse. Such
noninflationary increases in value must result either in the increase of the mar-
ital estate, in transmutation of the property, or a gift to the separate estate of
the titled spouse. The gift alternative contradicts the intent of the parties, the
underlying purposes of the statute, and the interspousal gift provision. In-
creases in value of separate property that are caused only or largely by eco-
nomic factors do not, on the other hand, diminish the marital estate. They,
and they alone, should properly be regarded as separate property.
Finally, the exchange provision of the statute cannot have been intended
as a limit on the capacity of a spouse to alienate his or her separate property.
If a spouse intends to maintain as separate property an asset that has been
acquired in exchange for separate property, he may easily do so. Making a
gift to the entireties of such property, however, is totally inconsistent with any
intention that the property remain separate. The critical issue is not whether
the property can be proved to be the product of an exchange of separate prop-
erty; rather, it is whether the owner intended to make a gift. A contrary result
would virtually- nullify the interspousal gift provision.
[Vol. 61
1983] EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 273
The statute itself indicates that the legislature intended that the goal of
preserving separate property should not be allowed to frustrate the basic pur-
pose of achieving fair distributions of property. Any approach that fails to
consider the actual contributions of the individual spouses and the marital unit
to the acquisition of property would severely undermine that intent. Interpre-
tation of the statute in a way that provides the means by which genuinely
equitable distributions of property can be achieved is necessary in order to
fulfill the very purpose of the legislature in enacting it.

